Thenetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshipinChinahasachievedgreatprogressandengendered conspicuousnegativeexternalitiesintheearlydevelopmentstage.Fewstudieshaveinvestigatedhow mediaentrepreneurshipcoordinateswithgovernmentregulationandtheinfluenceofgovernment regulationonmediaentrepreneurship.Thisstudyaimsatinvestigatinggovernmentregulationonthe flourishingnetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurship.Thisstudyperformssemi-structuredinterviews with14respondentswhoareexperiencedingovernmentregulationofthenetworkaudio-visualsector. Itisfoundthatlicensemanagementandcontentcensorshipareprincipalapproachestoregulating entrepreneurship.Themediacompanieshavebeenconstrainedbylimitedgovernmentsupportand socialresources,andthereforeendeavoredtolegitimatetheirbusinessbycollaboratingwithInternet conglomerates. Strict rules of content censorship discourage users from producing audio-visual content,andimposerestrictionsonInternetcompaniesandotherproducersproducinganddisplaying audio-visualcontent.
INTRodUCTIoN
Theaudio-visualsectorcoverstheindustriesoffilm,broadcasting(televisionandradio),videoand multimediaanditisdistinguishedfromcreativeindustryorcontentindustrywhichinvolvessubstantial artistic or creative endeavors (European Investment Bank, 2001) . Originating from the notion of audio-visualsector,networkaudio-visualindustryiscomposedofaudio-visualcontentworkson thetelecom,broadcastnetworkandInternet;however,theauthorsparticularlymainlyfocusonthe audio-visualindustrialdevelopment,pertinentmediapoliciesandregulationsonthebroadcastnetwork andInternetportals.Thenetworkaudio-visualindustryinChinahasobtainedanincreasingscale ofusersandestablishedplatforms,togetherwithnewtechnologicaldevelopmentandcommercial flourishment.ByJune2018,thereare609millionnetworkvideousersinChinawhooccupied76% ofthetotalInternetusers,withahalf-yeargrowthrateof5.2% (ChinaKnowledge,2018) . Theaudio-visualindustryinChinahasbeensignificantlydrivenbyentrepreneurialforcesbyadvancingand applyingtechnologicalprogress,particularly5G,artificialintelligence,virtualrealityandaugmented reality,tonewaudio-visualbusinesssince2015,suchaslivestreaming,eSportsandshortvideo. In view of the scope of network audio-visual entrepreneurship, we clarify the research domain in this study based on prior endeavors of conceptualizing entrepreneurship and media entrepreneurship. Davidsson(2005) suggesteddelineatingtheroleofentrepreneurshipinsocietyand definedentrepreneurshipphenomenonascompetitivebehaviordrivingthemarketprocess.Media entrepreneurshipasasetofevolvingentrepreneurialpracticeshasalsoreceivedresearchinterests andgainedmomentuminrecentyears (Hang&vanWeezel,2007) . Khajeheian(2017) integrated somekeyfeaturesoftheemergingmediaenvironmentsuchasdistinctionofcontentandplatform, valuedelivery,opportunitydevelopment,non-monetarybenefitintothedefinition.Inthisarticle,we willcontributetounderstandingthenetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshipatthecorporatelevel.In thissense,twocategoriesofmediacompaniesprovidingnetworkaudio-visualserviceareidentified astheanalysisobjectsinChina'smediamarket,namelythenewlycreatedmediaenterprises,the Internetconglomeratescombiningresourcesandhavinganimpactonthemarket.Thepredominant mediaconglomeratesinChinaamongmorethan200audio-visualenterprisesareiQIYI,Youkuand TencentVideo,ownedbythethreelargestinternetcompaniesinChina,Baidu,AlibabaandTencent respectively. The three internet corporations are conceived as financially resourced, distinctively competitiveandtechnologicallyinnovativeplayersinnetworkaudio-visualindustry,incomparison withotherpremiumnetworkfirmsandtraditionalfree-to-airbroadcasters.
Whenitcomestoanalyzingmediaentrepreneurshipatthecorporatelevel,itisconsequential tobeconcernedwithgovernmentpoliciesandtheentrepreneurswhooperatemediacorporations (Khajeheian,2017) ,particularlymediapolicyserverstoasustainingandbenignmediaenvironment forfurthermediainnovations.Alimitednumberofresearchershaveperformedpolicyreviewson certainmediaentrepreneurshippolicyindifferentgeographiccontextsasmediaentrepreneurshipisstill anundevelopedresearchfield.Mediaentrepreneurshippolicyhasbeenstudiedinanoperationalized waybyseveralresearchers,suchasFariborz(2018), Feldmann(2005) , Khajeheian(2014) , Leona (2017) andsoforth.Thecentraltopicinthestudiesofmediaentrepreneurshipfromtheperspective ofpoliciesistoexplorepolicystrategiestofacilitatenewentryandmoreindependentmediavoices (Hoag,2008 
BACKGRoUNd

The Chinese Network Audio-Visual Industry Context
Althoughthenetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshipinChinahasachievedgreatprogresswiththe impetusofcapitalandinformationcommunicationstechnologies,ithasengenderedconspicuous negativeexternalitiesduringthepreliminarystageofbusinessdevelopment,suchasaudio-visual contentpiracy,competitiveyieldsforhigh-pricedcopyright,pervasivevulgarizationanderoticism ofbothprofessional-generatedcontent(PGC)aswellasuser-generatedcontent(UGC).Sincethese externalities are conceived to be disadvantageous for the sustainable corporate development and a benign network environment for citizens, it has stimulated a set of administrative policies and regulatory measures from authorities at both the macro and the meso levels, together with selfregulationofassociations.Similarly,newissuedregulatorymeasureshavebeendirectlyenforcedon bothregisteredbroadcastersandnon-registeredbutinfluentialentrepreneurialsmallandmediumsizedenterprisestoreinforcecontentcensorship,anti-piracy,restrictimportingaudio-visualcontent fromforeignenterprises;meanwhile,theauthoritieshaveestablisheddesignatedbutlimitedfunds andawardstoencourageproducingnetworkaudio-visualcontentinaccordancewiththenational propagandadirectives.
However, the dominant authoritative regulation is presumably of less efficacy in achieving ParetoOptimuminabroadersenseofmediagovernance,whichisinconsistentwiththeregulatory outcomeofChina'snetworkaudio-visualindustry.Forinstance,thescaleofusersinlivestreaming sub-industryhadanannualincreaseof60%,reaching310millionin2016;yetthegrowthforecasts droppedto12%forthenextthreeyearsprincipallyduetoastricterregulatoryenforcement,which hassignificantlydiscouragedcontentproduction (AsiaVideoIndustryAssociation,2018) . Severalstudieshaveconfirmedstrongeffectsofnewtechnologiesandinnovationsonthelife patterns of Chinese netizens. As a consequence of the advancements in mobile technology and social media applications, Chinese netizens have become increasingly technological dependence anddemanding (Ge&Gretzel,2017) . Furtherempiricalevidenceshowslivestreamingasasociotechnologicalphenomenonhasastoundinginfluencesonthesocialbehaviorofusers(Luetal.,2018) .
The Chinese Media Regulation Context
Theparty-statehasbeenemployedtocaptureChinesepoliticalrealityandunderstanditsdominant roleinmediasystem,indicatingthatmediaisnotanindependententityinrelationtothestate.The state-ownedandstate-controlledmediaareconceivedasthemouthpieceofCCP,andtheirworkflow and routines are ideologically supervised according to party principles (dǎng xìng yuán zé) and administrativelyconstrainedundertheregulatorydirectivesofthegovernmentbodiesconcerned.
Anumberofstudieshavebeencarriedouttoexaminethetrajectoriesofcommercializationin thetraditionalandemergingmediasectors,aswellastheactiveroleofparty-stateinstructuring thestateregimeofcontroluponthecomplexmediasystem.Thehighlyauthoritarianstateregime hasbeenapreconditionandaconsequenceofaccelerateddevelopmentsafterChina's1989Choice (Zhao,2012) .Forinstance,Chinesepressstructurehasexperiencedamarketrationalizationandpress conglomerationengineeredbyChineseCommunistParty(CCP),whichhasenhancedthepolitical controlandmarketcapitalizationinpresssector (Zhao,2000) .Thisapproachhasbeenutilizedto counteract the fragmented and decentralized broadcasting structure resulting from autonomous innovation (Zhao,1998) .Inthissense,theensuingseriesofinnovationandentrepreneurshiphave been subject to subsequent advancements embedded in the context of the intertwining forces of party-statecontrolandcommercialization. TherearevariousexplanationsastothereasonswhyChineseauthoritieshavestartedinstitutional configurationsandpolicyenactments.Theemergingcommunicationtechnologiesnotablypromote civicengagementinpublicaffairsandthefreeflowofinformation (Huang,2011) .Chinesenetizens have been empowered to excoriate the frustrating performance of authorities, political elites and policies in a cohesive and provocative way, which has motivated authorities to consolidate its dominantroleandmaintainpoliticalstability(DeLisleetal.,2016).InlinewithDeLisleetal. (2016), MacKinnon(2013)arguesthatChineseauthoritiesareconcernedwithnetizens'activeparticipation inonlinediscussionandnetworksthatincreasetherisksofregimeinstability.Atthesubstantive level,themostinfluentialmultipleonlineplatformsareownedandcontrolledbyvitalprivateInternet corporations,coveringsocialmedia,e-commerce,livestreaming,broadcasting,video-sharing,multimediaserviceandonforth.Hence,thepoliticalsqueezehasbeenimposedondomesticandforeign privatecompaniesthatprovidemediaservice.
ThefollowingbrieflyreviewspriorstudiesonnetworkmediaregulationinChina'scontext.With thepurposeofstrengtheningCCP'spoliticalinfluencesonline,Chineseauthoritiesestablishedan electronicmonitoringsystemin2003andtheGreatFirewallconfiningtheinformationflows (Walton, 2001) .InabroadersenseofInternetgovernance,thecyber-sovereigntyframeworkisemployedto interpretChina'sstancewhichwasconstructeduponanddistinguishedfromtheUS-centric,market-orientedInternetgovernancescheme (Shen,2016) .Asetofspecificmediapolicieshavebeenenacted concerninginfrastructureconstruction,serviceguidanceandcontentregulation (Hu,2010) .
Originatingfromthefieldofpublicadministration,contentregulationwasgrantedinthelegal entitlements with Chinese characteristics (Cheung, 2006) . Content-rating scheme, as a choice of regulatoryinterventioninaudio-visualindustry,hasbeenadoptedinseveralcountriesandexpected tocombineindustryself-regulationwithpublicoversight (Saurwein&Latzer,2010) .Instead,Chinese authoritieshaveestablishedasophisticatedcontentcensorshipsystemforthetextualandaudio-visual contentontheInternet.Someresearchersaredevotedtoinvestigatingtheimpactsofcensorshipon stockprice(Dingetal.,2018),onChinesecitizens'resistance(Kouetal.2017),aswellasonnetizens' economicandpoliticalbeliefs(Chen&Yang,2018);still,noneofthestudiesinvestigatetheroleof censorshipinrelationtomediaentrepreneurship.
Theregulatoryenvironmentofnetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshiphastwomajorfeatures. Firstly, the main regulatory objects include the entrepreneurial media SMEs and the established conglomerates with entrepreneurial media business in private sectors. Despite the pervasive regulatory practices of authorities, media entrepreneurial corporations have not been subject to muchgovernmentintervenesduetotheregulatorylapses.Secondly,theflourishingentrepreneurship potentiallycontributestofosteringinformationflowandmediapluralism,whichisnotprioritizedas theobjectivesoftheparty-stateregime.
METHod
Respondents
Withthepurposeofexploringgovernmentregulationanditsinfluencesonaudio-visualindustry, this study performed semi-structured in-depth interviews with 14 professionals experienced in governmentregulationofnetworkaudio-visualsector.Potschka(2012,p.9)accentuatedtheinterviews forcommunicationpolicyresearch"asasurveyofopinionleadersintermsoftheroleofthestate, marketandmediasystem."HerzogandAli(2015)criticallyexaminedtheuseofeliteinterviews inmediaandcommunicationspolicyresearchandaddressedmethodologicalrigourcouldincrease thesignificanceofpolicyresearchinpolicy-makingprocesses.Inthisstudy,researchersusedthe snowballmethodtoreachpotentialrespondentsprincipallythroughtwocontactpersonsfromboth administrationandacademiarespectively.
All respondents in this study have more than three years' professional experience in government affairs in network audio-visual network sector. Two of the 14 respondents are researchers with a particular focus on analyzing media regulation and policy; another two respondentsareregulatorsfromgovernmentbodies;therestoftherespondentsarepractitioners involvedinmediabusinessmanagementandregulatoryaffairs(seeTable1).Allpractitioners, interviewedasrespondents,haveafull-timepositionintheregisteredmediaenterprisesin privatesectors.Theseenterprisesarerepresentativeintheflourishingnetworkaudio-visual industrybecausetheyhavebeenrunningentrepreneurialmediabusinessorplatformswithlots ofusersandfavourablemarketestimates.Besides,theprivatecompanieshavebeensubjectto profusegovernmentinterventionfromtheadministrationinBeijinginaformalandinformalway astheyareacknowledgedasbellwethersoftechnologicalandmediadevelopment.Conversely, thestate-ownedandstate-controlledmediaareinthecontrolofmuchexplicitandsystematic regulatorysystemduetotheauthoritativeleadershipofCCP.
Accordingtomediaregulationprinciples,asetofmediapoliciesandadministrativeregulations werecreatedbythecentralgovernmentofChinaandimplementedbyprovincialbranchesofthe governmententities.Thenetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshipinBeijingprosperouslydevelops regarding its users, registered enterprises, media applications and tax revenues. Accordingly, the respondentsinBeijingserveeitheraspractitionersorresearchersforoverthreeyears,withagood knowledgeofaudio-visualpoliciesandtendencies.Owingtotheideologicallyauthoritativepositions oftheadministrationinBeijing,itsadministrationmodehasbeenlearnedandtransplantedintoother provincialadministrations. AllinterviewswereconductedinChineseandtookplaceattherespondents'officesorother workplacestosatisfythedemandsofrespondents'schedule.Theinterviewswereaudio-recorded andtranscribedwiththeconsentrespondents.Thedatacollectionofthisstudyhasbeenproceeded intwophrases,respectivelyfromJunetoDecember2016andfromMarchtoMay2017.During the first phrase, entrepreneurial small and medium-sized enterprises started new media business inanichenetworkaudio-visualmarketwithoutacorrespondingapprovedservicelicense,suchas providinglivestreamingandothermediaserviceonmobiledevices.Inthelate2016,theauthorities haveenforcedasetofpoliciestoregulatenewnetworkaudio-visualserviceprovidersandplatforms withapurposeofclarifyingtheapplicabilityofpolicies.
Considering the opinions from respondents are associated with organizational norms and regulations,thisstudyusedothertextmaterialstoincreasedatacreditability,suchaspolicydocuments, policybriefings,governmentandcorporatereports.
FINdINGS
Licenses Management of Network Audio-Visual Service
The Atthesubstantiallevel,allrespondentsacknowledgethatithasbeenmuchchallengeablefor privateenterprisestoobtainthelicenses.AsstatedinClassified Catalogue of Internet Audio-visual Programme Services (for Trial Implementation) 1 ,ClassIitem5onlypermitsstate-controlledmedia owing Internet News Information Service License to apply for providing live streaming service; meanwhile,ClassIIitem7allowsprivatemediatoapply;however,noonewasapprovedtoprovide live streaming service until 2017. A number of live streaming providers in private sectors were engagedinthisentrepreneurialbusinesswithoutlicensesandwereregulatedbyauthoritiesinan informalandnon-regularway. Authorities irregularly send notices of orders through the internal system. For example, the government bodies send notices through Tencent RTX, Net-Ease bubble, Tencent QQ, etc. The enterprises are asked to give a response within about 15 minutes. Media enterprises are required to designate full-time staff regularly to supervise their audio-visual platforms. The censors shall receive training of content censorship organized by the government bodies to be empowered with techniques of censorship and keep updating the library of irregular content. In addition, authorities organize meetings on content regulation to give orders to corporate executives and managers, especially during the politically sensitive time periods. (Respondent 5, practitioner, 2016) Forlackofemergencyresponsemechanism,thepresentcensorshipsystemislesscompetent inmonitoringmassiveaudio-visualcontentconcerningfrequentlyupdatedaudio-visualprograms, creativeInternetslangsandtheincreasingpowerofUGC.
Censorship of Network Audio-Visual Content
Tobepreciseaboutcensorshipsystematthecorporatelevel,networkserviceprovidersmustcarry throughself-censorshiponaudio-visualprogramsbeforeprovidingthemforusersandprohibitthe programswithoutapprovals.Inlightoftheirorganizationalarrangement,themajorityofenterprises haveestablishedadivisionwhichkeepsintouchwithgovernmentbodiesandisengagedinavariety ofgovernmentaffairs,suchaspolicyresearch,coordinationofbusiness-governmentrelationsandon forth.Additionally,corporateexecutivesareappointedtotakeovercontentregulation,togetherwith anindependentteamofcensorsfromcorporations.Thecorporatecensorshipsystemsaredifferential basedontheircoreaudio-visualcontentbutgenerallyadopttheideaofMan-MachineSynergyfor censorship.Takinganonlinevideocompanyasanexample,itprovidesawiderangeofvideosincluding TVseries,moviesandlong-formvideos.Thecensorshipmeasuresareelaboratedbyonerespondent:
When producing audio-visual contents, online video companies must go through mandatory regulatory provisions and censorship from the planning stage to broadcasting, such as making a registration in content datasets, inviting experienced censors and regulators to inspect the themes and scenes of audio-visual content. Besides, UGC, including comment and barrage, shall be censored before publicity. Our censorship team proceeds 24/7 working in line with Provisions on the Administration of Internet Audio-Visual Program Service revised in 2015. Censors are able to re-inspect the comments and barrages of the problematic videos identified by censorship system or reported by users. In extreme cases, censors disable the functions of user participation in making comments and on forth, in case UGC provokes social instability. (Respondent 9, practitioner, July 2016) ThecontentcensorshipofPGCandUGCwasexplainedbyonerespondentfromanonlinevideo platforminatechnologicalway:
The censorship machine extracts the major cues of videos, and further compares them with the template of irregular videos from datasets. The proceeding time of these procedures usually takes five to ten minutes, depending upon the length of videos. The videos identified as irregular ones will be sent to censors for manual inspection. Moreover, the shielding function and intelligent recommendation by our system technologically prevent the popularity of government-unfavored videos. (Respondent 12, practitioner, July 2016) Considering the ideological nature of audio-visual content, censorship machine cannot identify the underlying opinions or ideas in the videos. In this sense, the influential media conglomerates have established their own editorial teams with a large number of censors. Navarria (2016) indicated that SINA corporation and Tencent company had up to 70,000 censors who were working on rumorcontrol and website-cleaning day and night for microblog and instant message platforms. The network audiovisual platforms in this study own censorship teams each of which employs 200-400 censors. Besides, the provincial government body has six administers at full-time positions for spot checks (Respondent 14, regulator, 2016) . A daily workload of over 4,000 videos and 40,000 comments is appointed to censors in an online video company. (Respondent 6, practitioner, July 2016) Thecensorsunsurprisinglyhaveastablejobtrajectoryfromjuniorcensorstoseniorcensors basedontheirworkingperformanceandtrainingcertificates.Asrequiredbyauthorities,censors fromenterprisesarerequiredtoapplyforparticipationintrainingsessionsorganizedbymulti-level governmentbodies.Thetrainingisaimedathelpingcorporationstoarousecensors'awarenessof certainaudio-visualcontentandexplicatecensorshipstandardsandtechniquesingeneral,butwith aspecificpurposeoncertainaudio-visualcontent. Forinstance,theSARFTorganizestrainingschoolsfivetimeseachyearbutwithalimitedplaces andgrantscertificatestosuccessfulgraduates;theMinistryofPublicSecurityorganizescensorship trainingforthechiefeditorsandcorporateexecutives;theOfficeoftheCentralLeadingGroupfor CyberspaceAffairsorganizesspecialtrainingsessionsonanti-terroristandeliminatingpornography andillegalpublications(Respondent9,practitioner,July2016).
Onlyfiveindividualsonaveragefromeachenterpriseinthisstudyhavesuccessfulapplications intheseofficialtraining.Hence,mediacompanieshavenochoicebuttoarrangeself-trainingfortheir censorteams.Despitethefactthatcensorsperformcensoringworksonbehalfofbothgovernment andenterprises,theirworkingbehavioursaredeterminedandevaluatedbycorporativemanagersto agreatextent.Theseemployeeswillpreferentiallykeeppacewithcorporateinterestsratherthan governmentexpectationsinsomecases.
Influences of Licenses Management on Network Audio-Visual Entrepreneurship
TheproportionofmobileInternetusersinnetizenshasreached98.3%byJune2018 (ChinaInternet NetworkInformationCenter,2018) .Thismediausehabithaspromotedtheflourishingdevelopment ofnetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurship,suchasnewmobiledevices,mediaplatformsandprofit models.Asetofaudio-visualcontenthasbeencommunicatedtothepublicthroughthesechannels, whichevenincludestheirregularaudio-visualcontentprohibitedinpre-existingserviceproviders and media platforms. The government bodies have been concerned about this entrepreneurial phenomenonbecauseofitscapacitiesofde-centralizingmarketstructureandcounteractingCCP's authoritarianism.Hence,authoritiesareinclinedtogiveadditionalservicepermissiontothelicenseholdingconglomeratesratherthanthenewentrepreneurialenterprises.
Themobileaudio-visualservicehasbeenregardedandregulatedasaseparatedcomponentin networkaudio-visualindustryviewingfromtheserialmediapoliciesandadministrativemeasures. Thisregulationtendencyundoubtedlygivesrisetoanincreaseinoperationalcostforallcompanies applyingforadditionalservicelicenses.Inturn,anumberofemergingaudio-visualserviceproviders willbeimpededbylicenserestrictionsforfurthermediainnovationsandsustainableaudio-visual entrepreneurship.Meanwhile,muchtighterregulationshavebeenimposedonUGC,PGCformobile devices,suchasconstraininguserstouploadandsharenetworkaudio-visualcontentinsomecases, discouraginguserstoproduceadiversityofaudio-visualcontent.
Content Censorship: A dilemma of Specifying Standards and Criterion
DespitethefactthattheprinciplesofcontentregulationwereestablishedinDecreeNo.56,Internet audio-visualprogrammingmaynotcontainthecontentinrelationto10items(十不准).Further, ChinaNetcastingServicesAssociationissuedGeneral Rules for Censorship of Network Audiovisual Programmeon30June2017,whichmadeatrialtospecifydetailedrulesinordertostrengthen thecontentregulationonnetworkaudio-visualindustry.Accordingtothesenewrules,displayof homosexuality is not allowed on network audio-visual platforms, which has been criticized and backlashedbyChinesesocialmediausersandinternationalhumanrightsorganizations.
Twoterms,politicsandideology,areunderlinedinallmediapolicies,andaudio-visualcontentis expectedandrequiredtoadheretocorrectpoliticaldirectionsandstrivetodisseminatecontemporary Chinesevalues.Atthesubstantiallevel,itistechnicallyproblematictoidentifythedomainsofpolitics andideologyinaudio-visualcontent:
Based on the experience of content regulation, such topics, in relation to National People's Congress, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Military parades and others, are obviously sensitive subject matters of politics. Other social events might be additionally conceived as politically sensitive subjects, such as 2008 Chinese winter storms, 2015 shipwreck of Oriental Star, 2015 Tianjin explosions and others, owing to its potential for provoking social instabilities and panics. (Respondent 9, practitioner, July 2016) However, as the flourishing entrepreneurial media in China, live streaming service and dronesempoweruserstoshootandbroadcastsocialaccidents,suchasearthquakesandfires, whichmaypositivelycontributetorescueworks.Asawhole,theauthoritiesperformcontent regulationwithadiscursivebutcompulsiveapproach,regardlessofthepotentialpositivesocial influencesonotherissues.
Theaudio-visualserviceprovidershavedevelopedatechnologicalcensorshipsystemtoidentify theso-calledirregularvideos:
When scanning videos, the system extracts several frames from videos and predicates it as a pornographic video if the exposed skin has been identified over 85%. In this case, the problematic videos will be deleted, and the publishers will be blocked if five videos are identified as irregular content. (Respondent 7, practitioner, September 2016) With the constant development of audio-visual content and media forms, it has become quite difficult for technological system to find out the irregular videos, such as the long-length videos with erotic pictures in a few frames. The authorities are greatly concerned with these drawbacks of censorship system and would like enterprises to further develop a more advanced and efficient system. (Respondent 13, regulator, October 2016) 
dISCUSSIoN ANd CoNCLUSIoN
Bothregulatorsandpractitionershaveacknowledgedtheroleofnetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurship in fostering industrial development, guiding public opinions and constructing social norms and values;moreover,theyhavealsowatchedoutforitsnegativeexternalities.TheNotice on Further Standardizing the Order of Network Audio-Visual Program Communication(关于进一步规范网络视 听节目传播秩序的通知)wasissuedbyChinaNationalRadioandTelevisionAdministration(NRTA) inMarch2018,whichisperceivedasthemoststringentcontentregulation.Besides,asetofpolicies pertinent to network audio-visual programme were continuously issued by national government bodiesinthepastthreeyears.Withtherapiddevelopmentofnetworkaudio-visualindustryinChina, aslightlygrowingbodyofworkshavesetouttoexploretheentanglementsofgovernmentbodies andlookforthelegalloopholesandregulatorygaps;however,scantystudiesinvestigatehowmedia entrepreneurshipcoordinateswiththegovernmentregulationaswellastheinfluenceofregulation onmediaentrepreneurshipandsocietyatlarge.Theregulatorycontextisbecomingmoreintricate withthetechnologicalandsocialchanges.Thisstudycollectedtheopinionsofbothregulatorsand entrepreneursongovernmentregulationofnetworkaudio-visualentrepreneurshipinordertoprovide creditableandempiricalevidence.
Itisfoundthatlicensemanagementandcontentcensorshipareprincipalapproachestoregulating network audio-visual entrepreneurship in the context of administration in Beijing. The oligopoly structureinnetworkaudio-visualindustryresultsfromthestructuraldrivingforcesofcapitalization and government intervention. Consequently, the entrepreneurial SMEs have been constrained by limitedgovernmentsupportandsocialresourcesandthusendeavoredtolegitimatetheirbusiness incollaborationwithInternetconglomerates.Stricterrulesofcontentcensorshipdiscourageusers to produce audio-visual content, impose restrictions on Internet companies and other producers producinganddisplayingaudio-visualcontent.
Governmentregulationofnetworkaudio-visualindustryinChina'scontexthasbeeninvestigated fragmentarily, together with some enduring questions associated with this theme. These include how continuity and changes of government regulation influence media entrepreneurship at the socialstructurelevel;howentrepreneurialcompaniescollaboratewithgovernmentbodiesforsocial development;howhumanagents(e.g.censors)dealwithgovernmentandcorporateexpectations.
